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BUCHANAN AND THE RIGHT TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY
JAMES W. ELY, JR*
It is most appropriate to mark the 100th anniversary of the signif-
icant Supreme Court opinion in Buchanan v. Warley.1 Despite some
renewed interest by scholars, this landmark ruling has not received
the recognition it deserves.2 In Buchanan the Supreme Court invali-
dated a Louisville ordinance imposing residential segregation in the
city by barring persons from occupying property in areas in which the
majority of houses were not occupied by persons of their race. As the
Court perceived, the practical effect of the ordinance was to inhibit
the sale and purchase of land. The avowed purpose was to require
separate racial blocks for white and black persons.3 The Court struck
this ordinance down as a deprivation of property without due process
of law, asserting that, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the or-
dinance could not extinguish "those fundamental rights in property
which it was intended to secure upon the same terms to citizens of
every race and color." 4 The case is especially remarkable because it
was decided in an era when racial segregation was ascendant in much
of the United States. The outcome, however, was consistent with a
widely shared societal norm stressing the importance of property
ownership. One can only speculate as to the subsequent neglect of
Buchanan. Perhaps the property-centered reasoning of Buchanan
proved an awkward fit for post-New Deal constitutionalism, which
downplayed the rights of property owners and urged judicial defer-
ence to legislative controls over economic matters.5  Likewise, the
Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, and Professor of History, Emeritus,
Vanderbilt University.
'Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
2See Colloquium, Rethinking Buchanan v. Warley, 51 VAND. L. REv. 787-1002 (1998).3For a discussion of the background of Buchanan, see generally Patricia Hagler Minter,
Race, Property, and Negotiated Space in the American South: A Reconsideration of Bu-
chanan v. Warley, in SIGNPOSTS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY 345-69
(Sally E. Hadden & Patricia Hagler Minter eds., 2013); Roger L. Rice, Residential Segre-
gation by Law, 1910-1917, 34 J. S. HiST. 179 (1968) (discussing segregation in the early
twentieth century); Elizabeth A. Herbin-Triant, Race and Class Friction in North Caroli-
na Neighborhoods: How Campaigns for Residential Law Divided Middling and Elite
Whites in Winston-Salem and North Carolina's Countryside, 1912-1915, J. S. HIST. 531-
72 (2017) (exploring residential law and class tensions in North Carolina).
4Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 79.
5 DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT 91 (2011) (maintaining that Buchanan "is forgotten, or over-looked, because it
does not accord with the caricature of Lochner-era jurisprudence presented by most legal
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ruling, couched in terms of property rights, does not readily comport
with the standard civil rights narrative grounded on equal protection
jurisprudence.6  Consequently, Buchanan remains something of a
constitutional orphan.
In any event, Buchanan had a considerable impact at the time.
To illustrate, Buchanan halted the growing movement to adopt racial
segregation laws in a number of cities.7 It thus spared the United
States from the problems arising from legally mandated residential
apartheid. Leon A. Higginbotham, Jr. aptly noted, "Buchanan was of
profound importance in applying a brake to decelerate what would
have been run-away racism in the United States."8
However, rather than focusing on the decision as a fledgling step
toward equal rights, I will explore the ramifications of Buchanan in
understanding the role of property rights in the polity. Clearly, the
Buchanan decision was grounded on the constitutionally protected
right to acquire property. For example, Justice William R. Day,
speaking for the Court, defined property in expansive terms: "Proper-
ty is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary
that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Consti-
tution protects these essential attributes of property."9 Justice Day in-
sisted that the Fourteenth Amendment operated "to qualify and entitle
a colored man to acquire property without state legislation discrimi-
nating against him solely because of color."'0 In reaching his conclu-
sion, Day affirmed a long-standing tenet of American constitutional-
ism - that property rights were not confined to protection of the status
quo but encompassed the opportunity to acquire property."
historians and constitutional scholars.").
6See Richard A. Epstein, Lest We Forget: Buchanan v. Warley and Constitutional Juris-
prudence of the 'Progressive' Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 787, 789 (1998) ("Instructively,
Buchanan was decided on grounds that had far more to do with the protection of property
than with the guarantee of equal protection."); David E. Bernstein, The Due Process
Right to Pursue a Lawful Occupation: A Brighter Future Ahead? 126 YALE L.J. F. 287,
301 (2016) (pointing out that Buchanan "which focused on property and contact rights,
was reinterpreted as an equal protection case."). For a decision reimagining Buchanan,
see Buckler v. Roder, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1371, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (opining that "there
was an obvious equal protection component to [the] ruling" in Buchanan).
7Herbin-Triant, supra note 3, at 533 (listing cities enacting residential segregation ordi-
nances).
8A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS
OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 126 (1996).
9Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917).
'01d. at 79.
"See JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 24 (1956) (asserting that law in the nineteenth
century did not simply favor the status quo, and famously concluding: "Dynamic rather
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Two observations with respect to Buchanan are in order. First,
Day's emphasis on the right to acquire property was not novel. As we
shall see, the right to acquire property had a long pedigree. In fact,
the Supreme Court of Georgia anticipated Buchanan in a 1915 deci-
sion when the court invalidated an Atlanta ordinance imposing resi-
dential segregation on due process grounds, reasoning that the effect
of the ordinance "was to destroy the right of the individual to acquire,
enjoy, and dispose of his property."'2
Second, the outcome in Buchanan was not well received in all
quarters. For instance, many law reviews were quite hostile. Influ-
enced by the Progressive movement with its fondness for planning
and land use controls, a number of reviews expressed concern that in-
dividual property rights should prevail over majoritarian wishes.13
The spread of land use controls in the 1920s was encouraged by the
Supreme Court decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Com-
pany upholding comprehensive zoning, 14 which set the stage for a re-
consideration of residential segregation.'5  In 1925, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana purported to distinguish Buchanan when it upheld
a New Orleans residential segregation ordinance. Revealingly, the
court compared segregation to restrictions on business in residential
districts, concluding that the ordinance "[was] only another kind of
zoning.. . 16 A concurring judge went further, warning that if the
doctrine in Buchanan was followed,
then that case marks a long step backwards in the
march of civilization; not so much because it inter-
feres with the segregation of the races (which will take
than static property, property in motion or at risk rather than property secure and at rest,
engaged our principal interest.").
12Carey v. City of Atlanta, 84 S.E. 456, 460 (Ga. 1915). Two years later, however, the
Court upheld a slightly revised statute applying prospectively over the objection that it
still violated the right to acquire property. Harden v. City of Atlanta, 93 S.E. 401, 403
(Ga. 1917).
James W. Ely, Jr., Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race, 51
VAND. L. REv. 953, 960 (1998).
14Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
1See F.D.G. Ribble, The Due Process Clause as a Limitation on Municipal Discretion in
Zoning Legislation, 16 VA. L. REv. 689, 696-99 (1930) (discussing racial zoning, and
questioning how Buchanan fit with then recent decisions affirming broad local discretion
in land use regulation). See also Martha A. Lees, Preserving Property Values? Preserv-
ing Proper Homes? Preserving Privilege? The Pre-Euclid Debate over Zoning for Exclu-
sively Private Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REv. 367, 368-69 (1994)
(pointing out that early zoning ordinances were driven by a desire of wealthy neighbor-
hoods to protect property values by excluding minorities).
Tyler v. Harmon (Harmon 1), 104 So. 200, 207 (La. 1925).
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care of itself), but more especially because it will
serve in future as a precedent against still other re-
strictions on the use of property, which in time, may
become necessary in the public interest; and it ought
therefore to be overruled before the rolling pebble be-
comes an avalanche.17
In its enthusiasm for land use controls, the Louisiana court gave no
attention to the right to acquire property. The Supreme Court, of
course, summarily reversed this decision.'8 As late as 1930, attorneys
for Richmond argued that the Supreme Court's endorsement of com-
prehensive zoning called into question the continuing validity of Bu-
chanan. Nonetheless, this contention was also flatly rejected.19
By strongly affirming the right to acquire property in the face of
community sentiment, the Supreme Court in Buchanan spoke to a
larger issue - who benefits from a principled property rights regime.
Over the course of American history, the constitutional protection of
property has sometimes been dismissed as a matter of concern only to
the wealthy. Prominent Progressives lambasted the Supreme Court as
a champion of the rich at the expense of workers.20 For example, one
scholar has asserted that by focusing on "the protection of property
and economic liberty" the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth centu-
ry "became a bulwark for the freedoms that mattered most to people
at the top of the heap."21 The outcome in Buchanan flatly contradicts
this simplistic view. It warrants emphasis that the beneficiaries of
Buchanan were middle-class blacks hoping to escape poor housing
conditions and move into more desirable neighborhoods. The deci-
sion eliminated a legal barrier to achieving that goal. Consequently,
Buchanan was not a victory for the wealthy but for those who aspired
"Id. at 208 (St. Paul, J. concurring). See also Tyler v. Harmon (Harmon II), 107 So. 704
(1926) (adhering to prior decision).
"sHarmon v. Tyler (Harmon III), 273 U.S. 668 (1927) (per curium).
19City of Richmond v. Deans, 37 F.2d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 1930), aff'd 281 U.S. 704
(1930).
20See Robert M. LaFollette, Introduction to GILBERT E. ROE, OUR JUDICIAL OLIGARCHY
vii (1912) ("And because this tremendous [judicial] power has been so generally exer-
cised on the side of the wealthy and the powerful few, the courts have become at last the
strongest bulwark of special privilege.").
21KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING To AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 179 (1989). See also Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How
the Supreme Court Contributes to Economic Inequality, 2014 UTAH L. REv. 389 (2014)
(arguing that since 1970 decisions by the Supreme Court have contributed to economic
inequality).
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to obtain property. 22 In fact, as discussed more fully below, a robust
property-rights jurisprudence often operates to benefit outsiders or
fledgling entrepreneurs. By the same token, economic regulations
frequently benefit entrenched special interests. Notwithstanding a
vast literature on property rights, scholars have given surprisingly lit-
tle attention to the right to acquire property. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to redress this neglect by exploring the historical background
and contemporary significance of the constitutional right of acquisi-
tion.
EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY
In the Revolutionary Era the notion of the "pursuit of happiness"
was closely linked with the right to obtain property.23 Several early
state constitutions clearly spelled out this association. For example,
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 proclaimed: "That all men are
born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent
and inalienable rights, amongst which are, the enjoying and defending
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."24 As one historian has
explained, these early state constitutions manifested "a desire to guar-
antee not only freedom of expression and of religious exercise but al-
so the freedom to acquire property."25 In the same vein, James Madi-
son in 1792 asserted that government should not deny to its citizens
"that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations,
which not only constitute their property in the general sense of the
word; but are the means of acquiring property strictly so called."2 6
During the antebellum period many new states, including Arkansas,
California, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, and Ohio, adopted constitutional
language guaranteeing the right to acquire property. Today a majority
of state constitutions contain explicit right-to-acquire provisions.27
22The reasoning in Buchanan was not confined to land use issues. It protected aspiring
barbers as well. In 1926 Atlanta enacted an ordinance prohibiting black barbers from
serving white women and white children under the age of 14. Chaires v. City of Atlanta,
139 S.E. 559, 559 (Ga. 1927). In Chaires, the Supreme Court of Georgia invalidated this
ordinance as it pertained to providing barber services for white children. Citing Buchan-
an, it concluded that the law denied the "right to carry on a lawful business" in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 563-66.
2 3
WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND
THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 193 (1980).
24PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I-II (1776).
2 5ADAMS, supra note 23, at 194.
2614 JAMES MADISON, Property, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266-68 (Charles F.
Hobson and Robert A. Rutland eds., 1983).
27Peter J. Galie, State Courts and Economic Rights, 496 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN
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Before the Civil War, state courts occasionally addressed the
right to acquire property. In 1840 the Supreme Court of Arkansas,
invoking the express language in the state constitution, declared: "The
right of citizens to acquire, possess, and protect property cannot be
questioned. . . 28 The court added that "every individual may law-
fully acquire and possess any species or description of property.. ."29
and went on to invalidate a tax levied on the privilege of keeping bil-
liard tables payable before the citizens possessed such tables. View-
ing this levy as a restriction on the right to acquire property, the court
warned that the legislature was not free to impose similar charges on
the acquisition of other types of property.
Throughout the Nineteenth Century, prominent commentators
endorsed the right to acquire as an attribute of property ownership. In
his Commentaries on American Law James Kent observed: "The ab-
solute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal
security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and en-
joy property."30 Kent added: "The sense of property is graciously im-
planted in the human breast, for the purpose of rousing us from sloth,
and stimulating us to action; and so long as the right of acquisition is
exercised in conformity to the social relations, and the moral obliga-
tions which spring from them, it ought to be sacredly protected."3 In
1868, Thomas M. Cooley, in his landmark A Treatise on the Constitu-
tional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the
States of the American Union, strongly endorsed the right to acquire
property. Cooley proclaimed: "The man or the class forbidden the
acquisition or enjoyment of property in the manner permitted to the
community at large would be deprived of liberty in particulars of pri-
mary importance to his or their 'pursuit of happiness.,,
32
Likewise, federal court decisions began to stress the constitution-
al status of the right to acquire property. For example, in Corfield v.
Coryell (1823) Justice Bushrod Washington was called upon to de-
termine what were the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States" as guaranteed by Article IV, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion.33 Defining privileges and immunities in terms of the rights of
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 76, 83 (1988).
28Stevens & Woods v. State, 2 Ark. 291, 298-99 (1840).
291d. at 300.
302 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (1827).
3 Id. at 257.
32THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 393 (1868, re-
print 2002).
33U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution provides in
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"the citizens of all free governments," Justice Washington concluded
that such privileges included "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such re-
straints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good
of the whole."34 Notably, Justice Washington's enumeration of privi-
leges was largely drawn from the declaration of rights in state consti-
tutions of the Revolutionary Era. Justice Washington's reading of the
privileges and immunities clause, however, has long been regarded as
authoritative. Nonetheless, scholars have debated whether Justice
Washington construed the clause to affirm certain substantive rights
enjoyed by all citizens of free governments, or simply barred discrim-
ination on the basis of state citizenship.
The right to acquire property received an added boost with the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (the "1866 Act"). Enacted in
response to the black codes in southern states following the end of the
Civil War, the 1866 Act declared that all persons "shall have the
same right . .. to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property . .. as is enjoyed by white citizens."35  Law-
makers saw the right to property as essential for former slaves to par-
ticipate in American society.36 As such, the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended in part to eliminate any question about the constitution-
ality of the 1866 Act.37 "No one who sat in Congress or in the state
legislatures that dealt with the Fourteenth Amendment," one historian
concluded, "doubted that section one was designed to put to rest any
doubt about the power of the federal government to protect basic
common law rights of property and contract."38
Adopting the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 significantly al-
tered the constitutional landscape. To illustrate, during the late Nine-
teenth Century and early Twentieth Century, the right to acquire
property found shelter under this provision. In 1885, Justice Stephen
J. Field, writing for the Supreme Court in Barbier v. Connolly, de-
part: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citi-
zens in the several States." Id.
34Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
35Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 11, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
36HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 94 (1991) ("In 1866 Congress
selected contracts and property as the civil rights worthy of protection because, within its
classical world view of the world, the right to make contracts and the right to own proper-
ty were the keys to economic success.").
37See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO




clared that the Fourteenth Amendment established "that all persons
should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness, and acquire and
enjoy property."39 However, recognition of a right to acquire proper-
ty raised the question of how a person was to obtain such property.
There must be some means of acquisition in order to make such a
right meaningful. As a practical matter, the right to acquire found ex-
pression in two related doctrines which evolved as part of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. The first was hostility to state-conferred
monopoly, a sentiment that can be traced to the Revolutionary Era.
As Field explained in his famous dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-
house Cases in 1873, "[a]ll monopolies in any known trade or manu-
facture" encroach upon "the liberty of citizens to acquire property and
pursue happiness."40 The second was acknowledgement of a right to
follow lawful callings. In 1884, Justice Joseph P. Bradley empha-
sized that "[t]he right to follow any of the common occupations of life
is an inalienable right" grounded on the pursuit of happiness."4'
Similar to Field, Bradley maintained that grants of monopoly
abridged this right and deprived the parties of property and liberty
without due process.42
Four years later the Supreme Court cautiously embraced a consti-
tutional right to follow ordinary callings in Powell v. Pennsylvania.4 3
Writing for the Court, Justice John Marshall Harlan observed:
The main proposition advanced by the defendant is
that his enjoyment upon terms of equality with all oth-
ers in similar circumstances of the privilege of pursu-
ing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring,
holding, and selling property, is an essential part of his
rights of liberty and property as guarantied [sic] by the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment. The court assents to this
general proposition as embodying a sound principle of
constitutional law.44
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana in 1897 Justice Rufus W. Peckham, writing
for a unanimous Supreme Court, went a step further, linking the right
39Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
40Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 101 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
4'Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse and Livestock Co. v. Crescent City Livestock Landing
and Slaughterhouse Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring).
42Id. at 763-64.
43Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 684 (1888).
44Id. at 684.
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to acquire and the right to pursue lawful vocations with the right to
make contracts.45 Justice Peckham explained that "[i]n the privilege
of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding,
and selling property, must be embraced the right to make all proper
contracts in relation thereto."46 A year later, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed this principle stating
[a]s the possession of property, of which a person
cannot be deprived, doubtless implies that such prop-
erty may be acquired, it is safe to say that a state law
which undertakes to deprive any class of persons of
the general power to acquire property would also be
obnoxious to the same [due process] provision."47
By the early Twentieth Century, the right to pursue ordinary trades
seemed well established as a constitutional baseline. Invalidating a
state law curtailing the employment of aliens in 1915, the Supreme
Court in Truax v. Raich declared that "[i]t requires no argument to
show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of
the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom. and op-
portunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to
secure."48
State courts also played a pivotal role in fashioning a due process
right to pursue ordinary avocations. In the leading case of In re Ja-
cobs, decided in 1885, the New York Court of Appeals defined liberty
as not only freedom from restraint but as encompassing the right of a
person "to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any
lawful trade or avocation."49 Applying the foregoing principle, the
court struck down a state law prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in
tenement houses in New York City as a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law.50 The court found unpersuasive the public health
45Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
461d. at 591. See James W. Ely, Jr., Rufus W. Peckham and Economic Liberty, 62 VAND.
L. REv. 591, 606-38 (2009), for a discussion of Peckham's commitment to economic
freedom and property rights.
47Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 (1898).
48Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
491n re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 106 (1885). See James W. Ely, Jr, "To Pursue any Lawful
Trade or Avocation": The Evolution of Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth
Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 917, 938-945 (2006), for an analysis of Jacobs. "The right
to follow a calling would find increased, but never complete, judicial acceptance, and Ja-
cobs would be widely cited in the late nineteenth century." Id at 943.
501n re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. at 112-15.
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rationale employed to justify the statute.5 1 Three years later the same
court reiterated that liberty included "the right of one to use his facili-
ties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his
livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or av-
ocation."5 2
The Supreme Court of Illinois specifically fused the right to ac-
quire property with the freedom to pursue a trade:
The liberty of the citizen includes the right to acquire
property, to own and use it, to buy and sell it. It is a
necessary incident of the ownership of property that
the owner shall have a right to sell or barter it, and this
right is protected by the constitution as such an inci-
dent of ownership. When an owner is deprived of the
right to expose for sale and sell his property, he is de-
prived of property, within the meaning of the constitu-
tion, by taking away one of the incidents of owner-
ship. Liberty includes the right to pursue such honest
calling or avocation as the citizen may choose, subject
only to such restrictions as may be necessary for the
protection of the public health, morals, safety, and
welfare. The state, for the purpose of public protec-
tion, may, in the proper exercise of the police power,
impose restrictions and regulations; but the right to
acquire and dispose of property is subject only to that
power. The individual may pursue, without let or hin-
drance from any one, all such callings or pursuits as
are innocent in themselves, and not injurious to the
public. These are fundamental rights of every person
living under this government.53
After stressing the right to acquire property and follow callings, the
court voided a municipal ordinance barring department stores from
selling meat and food products as a deprivation of property and liber-
ty without due process.54
Likewise, other state courts emphasized the right to acquire
property as a constitutional norm. Pointing to the right-to-acquire
language in the state constitution, the New Jersey Court of Errors and
5lid.
52People v. Gillson, 17 N.E. 343, 345 (N.Y. 1888).
53City of Chicago v. Netcher, 55 N.E. 707, 708 (Ill. 1899).
54Id. at 108-114.
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Appeals in 1906 dealt at length with this principle:
The common law has long recognized as a part of the
boasted liberty of the citizen the right of everyman to
freely engage in such lawful business or occupation as
he himself may choose, free from hindrance or ob-
struction by his fellow men, saving such as may result
from the exercise of equal or superior rights on their
part ... This right is declared by our Constitution to
be unalienable. The first section of the Bill of Rights
sets forth that 'all men are by nature free and inde-
pendent, and have certain natural and unalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defend-
ing life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protect-
ing property, and of pursuing and obtaining happi-
ness.' As part of the right of acquiring property there
resides in every man the right of making contracts for
the purchase and sale of property, and contracts for
personal services which amount to the purchase and
sale of labor. It makes little difference whether the
right that underlies contracts of the latter sort is called
a personal right or a property right. It seems to us im-
possible to draw a distinction between a right of prop-
erty and a right of acquiring property that will make a
disturbance of the latter right any less actionable than
a disturbance of the former. In a civilized community,
which recognizes the right of private property among
its institutions, the notion is intolerable that a man
should be protected by the law in the enjoyment of
property, once it is acquired, but left unprotected by
the law in his efforts to acquire it.55
In the same year, the Supreme Court of California, relying on
similar wording in the state constitution, struck down a statute making
it a crime to sell theatre tickets at a higher price than that originally
charged by the management. 56
By the early twentieth century courts spoke less frequently of the
right to acquire property.57 The right to acquire had been, as a practi-
5 5Brennan v. United Hatters of North America, Local No. 17, 65 A. 165, 170-71 (N.J.
1906).
56Exparte Quarg, 84 P. 766, 766-67 (Cal. 1906).
57See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Company, 242 U.S. 539, 549 (1917) (McKenna, J.), for an
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cal matter, folded into the right to pursue lawful callings, which was
characterized as a liberty interest under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its state counterparts.
LICENSING
Licensure was certainly not new in the late nineteenth century.
Inns and taverns had been licensed and regulated in the colonial era.ss
Many states had also long licensed the business of peddling, a move
likely designed to curtail competition with small-town merchants.59
Still, the flow of legislation imposing license requirements on persons
who wished to engage in certain trades and occupations spiked in the
last decades of the nineteenth century, raising constitutional questions
about the extent of freedom to pursue vocations.60 As the Supreme
Court of Washington observed in 1906:
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that legislation of
this kind is on the increase. Like begets like, and eve-
ry legislative session brings forth some new act in the
interest of some new trade or occupation. The doctor,
the lawyer, the druggist, the dentist, the barber, the
horseshoer, and the plumber have already received fa-
vorable consideration at the hands of our Legislature,
-and the end is not yet, for the nurse and the undertaker
are knocking on the door. It will not do to say that
any occupation which may remotely affect the public
health is subject to this kind of legislation and con-
trol. 6 1
The court expressed alarm that "it will be but a short time before a
man cannot engage in honest toil to earn his daily bread without first
purchasing a license or permit from some board or commission."62
exception. The Court stated, "[wle know that, in the concept of property, there are the
rights of its acquisition, disposition, and enjoyment, - in a word, dominion over it." Id.
58Paton Yoder, Tavern Regulation in Virginia: Rationale and Reality, 87 VA. MAG. HIST.
& Blo. 259, 269-72 (1979).
59HENRY W. FARNAM, CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED
STATES TO 1860, 85-89 (1938). Farnam writes that, "[t]he main reason for the restrictive
legislation was undoubtedly the influence of shopkeepers, who hoped to secure the entire
trade for themselves." Id. at 87.
6 0Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910:
A Legal and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REv. 487, 494-502 (1965).
6tState ex rel. Richey v. Smith, 84 P. 851, 854 (Wash. 1906), overruled in part by City of
Tacoma v. Fox, 290 P. 1010, 1012 (Wash. 1930).
621Id.
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The Washington court highlighted a paradox. Even as federal
and state courts were placing a seal of approval on the right to pursue
callings, state legislators in the late nineteenth century enacted a host
of laws governing admission into various occupations and raising en-
try barriers to competitors. Licensing was rarely imposed on an oc-
cupation against its wishes. On the contrary, it bears emphasis that
such regulations were usually passed at the behest of organized
groups rather than as the result of a popular clamor for licensing.
"Occupational groups," Morton Keller aptly noted, "mounted consid-
erable political pressure in their quest for control over entry and prac-
tice."63  These so-called "friendly" laws were animated by several
motives, including the desire for enhanced professional prestige and
the elimination of "unfair" competition by limiting entry to particular
trades. As Lawrence M. Friedman explained: "Occupational licens-
ing is a technique for creating an occupational monopoly; all unli-
censed practitioners are excluded both from the group and from the
occupation."64 Licensing laws were clearly in tension with the ex-
pressed judicial commitment to the right to follow common avoca-
tions and the preservation of competition.65 Cooley highlighted this
juxtaposition in 1878, observing that "a free state has no power to
compel the taking out of a license as a condition precedent to the fol-
lowing of the ordinary pursuits of life."66 He added: "Licenses may
doubtless be required to be taken out by those employed in occupa-
tions the following of which is not a matter of right and those which
are 'affected with a public interest' . . . But in the case of the ordinary
and necessary avocations of the day, a license can cut no figure, and
to require one to be taken, unless for the purpose of taxation, would
be wholly inadmissible."67  However, as subsequent developments
demonstrated, Cooley's views did not carry the day.
Licensing was invariably defended as an exercise of the police
power to protect the public health, safety and welfare.68 Many licens-
63MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 412 (1977).
64Friedman, supra note 60, at 504.
6 5KELLER, supra note 63, at 412 ("The licensing and certification of occupations posed in
an acute form the tension between the desire to preserve a society of free competitors and
the desire to secure protection from the rigors of a market economy.").
66Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, 54 PRINCETON REV.
233, 266-67 (1878).
67,d.
68Walter Gellhom, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 11 (1976)
(pointing out that "licensing has been eagerly sought-always on the purported ground
that licensure protects the uninformed public against incompetence or dishonesty, but in-
variably with the consequence that members of the licensed group become protected
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ing laws were challenged, but most of the laws passed constitutional
muster. Courts wrestled with the determination of what were com-
mon occupations, and with whether the proffered health and safety
justification was sufficiently compelling to trump the right to follow
ordinary vocations. In 1904, Ernst Freund questioned "whether it is
possible to discover fixed principles underlying the restrained trades,
and thus establish a definite scope of constitutional liberty of pursuit
of livelihood." 69 The answer proved elusive, and the range of com-
mon callings steadily contracted.
To be sure, some license requirements ran afoul of the constitu-
tional right to pursue lawful avocations. For instance, several state
courts invalidated laws requiring persons to pass an examination and
pay a fee in order to obtain a license to practice horseshoeing. Find-
ing no relationship between societal welfare and the license require-
ment, they reasoned that the law abridged the right to follow common
callings.70 Indeed, the Supreme Court of Illinois expressed concern
about the potential reach of legislative power over employment op-
portunities: "If this act is valid, then the legislature of the state can
regulate almost any employment of the citizen by the requirement of
previous study, and previous examination, and the payment of a li-
cense fee, and the issuance of a license."71  If courts treated horse-
shoeing as a prime example of a common calling, they had more dif-
ficulty with the licensing of plumbers. A few courts treated laws
requiring plumbing licenses as an impairment of an ordinary voca-
tion,72 but the majority of courts upheld such legislation.73 The ma-
jority reasoned that inadequate sewage systems were a health hazard,
and therefore, stressed the need for skilled workers.74
against competition from newcomers.").
69
ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 533
(1904).
ToSee, e.g., People v. Beattie, 89 N.Y.S. 193, 195-96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904); In re Aubry,
78 P. 900, 902 (Wash. 1904).
7 Bessette v. People, 62 N.E. 215, 219 (Ill. 1901).
72See, e.g., Richey v. Smith, 84 P. 851, 854 (Wash. 1906); Replogue v. City of Little
Rock, 267 S.W. 353, 358 (Ark. 1925).
73People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden, 39 N.E. 686, 689 (N.Y. 1895) (upholding re-
quirement that master plumbers must pass an examination and receive certificate of com-
petence); Singer v. State, 19 A. 1044, 1045 (Md. 1890) (observing that "in a large city
like Baltimore, with its extensive system of drainage and sewerage, the public health de-
pends upon the proper and efficient manner in which the plumbing work is executed");
Douglas v. People ex rel. Ruddy, 80 N.E. 341, 344 (Ill. 1907). See Friedman, supra note
60, at 520-23.
74David E. Bernstein has pointed out that plumber licensing statutes enacted for public
health concerns could serve as entry barriers, and lamented that "for the most part courts
refused to give more than cursory scrutiny to the motives behind plumbers' licensing
436 Vol. 48:2
2018 BUCHANAN AND THE RIGHT TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY
Even in situations where occupational icensing was deemed ap-
propriate, courts considered whether the licensing requirements were
so onerous and expensive as to effectively hamper entry by newcom-
ers to certain lines of work or prevent continued practice by some ex-
isting participants.75 "The restrictive consequence of licensure," Wal-
ter Gellhorn, reminds us, "is achieved in large part by making entry
into the regulated occupation expensive in time or money or both."76
Statutes on embalming, requiring that undertakers be licensed em-
balmers, illustrate the problem. In 1910, the New York Court of Ap-
peals agreed that, in view of health concerns in handling bodies, states
could require undertakers to obtain a license.77  The court found,
however, that some of the requirements to secure a license, such as
the condition that an undertaker must be also licensed as an embalm-
er, were arbitrary and unnecessary to public health.78 Thus, the meas-
ure was invalidated as an interference with the right to engage in a
lawful business.79 In addition, the court also stressed the monopolis-
tic feature of these burdensome requirements. "We cannot refrain
from the thought," it proclaimed, "that the act in question was con-
ceived and promulgated in the interests of those the engaged in the
undertaking business and that the relation which the business bears to
the general health, morals, and welfare of the state had much less in-
fluence upon its originators than the prospective monopoly that could
be exercised with the aid of its provisions."80
The grant of a license invariably entailed payment of a fee to de-
fray the expense of ascertaining the qualifications of the proposed li-
censee. Courts had no difficulty in upholding the requirement of a
reasonable fee. On occasion, however, courts looked skeptically at
high license fees which were transparently designed to prohibit, not
regulate, the affected business.81 A case in point involved emigrant
agent laws enacted in a number of southern states in the late nine-
statutes or the statutes' implementation." DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF
REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM
RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 31-36 (2001).
75See, e.g., Singer, 19 A. at 1045.
76Gellhorn, supra note 68, at 12.
7People v. Ringe, 90 N.E. 451, 453 (N.Y. 1910).
7 Id. at 454.
7Id
s01d. at 454. See also Wyeth v. Thomas, 86 N.E. 925, 928 (Mass. 1909) (invalidating
administrative regulation stating that one could not engage in business of undertaking
without being licensed as an embalmer, as a violation of the right to pursue vocations).




teenth century. Agents, often representing northern business interests,
began to recruit impoverished black agricultural workers in the rural
south for employment outside the region. Such efforts threatened the
ability of white planters to control local labor markets and hold down
labor costs. In response, some southern states enacted emigrant agent
laws that required agents to pay huge fees to obtain a license, but con-
tained no regulation as to the character of the applicant or manner of
the business.82 In 1893, the Supreme Court of North Carolina struck
down a statute setting a license fee of $1000, a huge sum at the time,
for an emigrant license. 8 In doing so, the court concluded that the
occupation of emigrant agent was not so harmful to the public that it
could be outlawed altogether, and that the fee amounted to an indirect
method of prohibition.84 The "very large license fee," the court held,
violated the right to pursue lawful occupations.8 5
On the whole, however, courts readily accepted the spread of oc-
cupational licensing, despite the inevitable impact on employment
opportunities. For example, courts had no difficulty sustaining laws
that imposed license requirements on highly skilled and technical pro-
fessionals, such as physicians,86 dentists, 8and veterinarians, where
the risk of harm to the public was high. The status of other occupa-
tions, including barbers,8 9 and blacksmiths, was less clear and open to
82BERNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 10-27 (analyzing emigrant agent laws).
83State v. Moore, 18 S.E. 342, 434, 347 (N.C. 1893).
841d. at 345.
Mid. at 346.
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-23, 128 (1889) (Field, J.) (affirming the right
to follow ordinary callings, but finding that state could set qualifications for physicians).
Wilkins v. State, 16 N.E. 192, 193 (Ind. 1888); State ex rel. Smith v. Bd. of Dental Ex-
aminers, 72 P. 110, 111-12 (Wash. 1903).
8 8Ex parte Barnes, 119 N.W. 662, 663 (Neb. 1909) (recognizing authority of state to pro-
hibit practice of veterinary medicine without a license).
89Courts generally upheld the licensing of barbers. See e.g., State v. Zeno, 81 N.W. 748,
749-50 (Minn. 1900); State v. Walker, 92 P. 775, 776 (Wash. 1907). See also MORTON
KELLER, REGULATING A NEw ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN
AMERICA, 1900-1933 (1990) Keller observed that:
[E]xtensive licensing of barbers came early and spread widely, in part
because of the belief the haircutting and shaving were potential haz-
ards to public health, in part because licensing served as a form of un-
ionization, and in part because it was a useful way to drive black bar-
bers out of the trade.
Id. at 92; David Fellman, A Case Study in Administrative Law - The Regulation of Bar-
bers, 26 WASH. U. L. REv. 213, 241 (Jan. 1941) (noting the widespread adoption of li-
censing laws regulating barbering, but declaring that "one may question the legitimacy of
those features of the existing barber laws which are designed to restrict unduly the oppor-
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debate. But in the end, these callings also were not deemed common
vocations open to all. Licenses continued to expand steadily in the
first decades of the twentieth century. For example, in 1917, Califor-
nia became the first state to require real estate brokers to be li-
censed.90 In short, by the 1920s, the belief in free entry into occupa-
tions was of diminishing efficacy and received declining judicial
support. The Supreme Court occasionally endorsed the right to fol-
low a calling, but usually in dicta that did not have bearing on the
case at bar.91
ANTI-COMPETITIVE REGULATIONS
Licensing was not the only method of restricting the right of in-
dividuals to pursue callings. Even more dramatic were regulations
calculated to protect existing economic interests from competition. A
leading example was the sustained legislative assault on the produc-
tion of oleomargarine. Starting in the 1870's, the manufacture of in-
expensive and spoilage-resistant margarine posed a dangerous threat
to the dairy industry. In response, numerous state legislatures, acting
at the behest of dairy farmers, enacted various laws designed to crip-
ple the sale of margarine as a competitor for butter.92 For instance, a
New York law banned the production and sale of "any article de-
signed to take the place of butter or cheese produced from pure una-
dulterated milk." 93 The New York Court of Appeals, in the 1885 case
of People v. Marx, would not have it. Striking down the law, the
court stressed that, "it is one of the fundamental rights and privileges
of every American citizen to adopt and follow such lawful industrial
pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see fit." 94 The
court asked: "Who will have the temerity to say that these constitu-
tional principles are not violated by an enactment which absolutely
prohibits an important branch of industry for the sole reason that it
competes with another, and may reduce the price of an article of food
tunities of entering the trade, and to control price and service competition within it").
Licensing laws were also designed to limit the practice of black barbers to black custom-
ers. BERNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 36-41.
90KELLER, supra note 89, at 93 (noting rapid spread of licensing of real estate brokers).
91See e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (McReynolds, J.) (declaring that
liberty denotes the right of an individual "to engage in any of the common occupations of
life").
92Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story
of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 83, 88-118 (Jan. 1989) (providing an insight-
ful treatment of the dairy lobby's campaign against oleomargarine).




for the human race?" The court concluded by decrying "the evils
which would result from legislation which should exclude one class
of citizens from industries, lawful in other respects, in order to protect
another class against competition."95
The dairy industry lost the initial battle, but ultimately won the
war. As discussed above, the Supreme Court acknowledged the con-
stitutional right to pursue ordinary callings and acquire property in
Powell v. Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, the Court sustained a Pennsyl-
vania law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of margarine as an ex-
ercise of the police power. The Court deferred to the legislature's
declaration that margarine posed such a serious threat to public health
and such a risk of fraud as to justify suppression of the business.
96 In
so doing, the Court accepted at face value legislative findings to this
effect. Under the Court's reasoning, it would appear that the right to
pursue callings was largely toothless. Field dissented alone, main-
taining that the police power did not extend to outlawing the manu-
facture of a healthy and nutritious article of food. Charging that un-
der the majority's analysis a state legislature could forbid the sale of
any type of food whenever it wished, he warned: "The doctrine as-
serted is nothing less than the competency of the legislature to pre-
scribe ... what shall be manufactured and sold within its limits, and
what shall not be thus manufactured and sold." 97 Quoting at length
from Marx concerning the right to follow lawful vocations, Field
found the health rationale a pretense and rejected the notion of unbri-
dled legislative police power over food items as unacceptable.
Over time the rationale for anti-margarine laws shifted from al-
leged health concerns to the equally dubious prevention of market-
place deception. New Jersey enacted a law barring the sale of marga-
rine colored with annotto, a coloring agent that imparted a yellow
color. The object of this law, according to the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, "was to secure to dairymen, and to the public generally, a
fuller and fairer enjoyment of their property, by excluding from the
market a commodity prepared with the view of deceiving those pur-
chasing it . . . ."98 Despite its obvious protectionist character and the
absence of any evidence that the product was unwholesome, the court
upheld the validity of the law. As Keller correctly noted: "The courts
generally sustained the antimargarine laws."99
95Id. at 34.
96Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888).
971d. at 689-90.
98State v. Newton, 14 A. 604, 606 (N.J. 1888).
99KELLER, supra note 63, at 413.
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Anti-competitive measures also extended to labor contracts. In
the early Twentieth Century, a number of southern states enacted laws
that imposed criminal sanctions on farm laborers who left their em-
ployment during the term of a contract. The details of such legisla-
tion varied, but the obvious purpose was to curtail the mobility of ten-
ant farmers, largely black, and hamper their ability to change jobs or
find other employers. Critics charged that this legislation amounted
to a type of peonage, requiring personal service in payment of a
debt.00 The reactions of southern state courts were mixed, but the
Supreme Court of Alabama in the 1904 case of Toney v. State, de-
clared such a state law unconstitutional as an infringement of the right
to make employment contracts.10 A decade later the Supreme Court
of Mississippi followed suit.102
Licensing as a form of regulation was also employed to stifle
competition. The ice industry was a case in point. The emergence of
home refrigeration in the 1920s gravely harmed the business of mak-
ing and selling ice, and the industry entered a period of decline. In a
manner reminiscent of the anti-margarine laws, legislators in a num-
ber of states responded by enacting laws to safeguard the interests of
existing ice companies by imposing market entry restrictions.'03 Ar-
kansas, for example, passed a law empowering a commission to both
fix the price of ice and to deny a license to any firm "where the facili-
ties for the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ice already existing
are sufficient to meet the public needs therein."'04 As the Supreme
Court of Arkansas in 1929 correctly perceived, "the virtual effect of
the provisions in the statute adverted to is the creation of monopo-
lies . . . ."105 Emphasizing that provisions of the state constitution ex-
pressly affirmed the right to acquire property and barred monopoly
grants, the court pointed out that the manufacture and sale of ice was
not injurious to the public health and safety.106 Accordingly, the court
100 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 116 (2002);
William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A Preliminary
Analysis, 42 J. S. HIST. 31, 42-47 (1976).
101 Toney v. State, 37 So. 332, 334 (Ala. 1904). An amended Alabama law was struck
down as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal peonage law. Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (Hughes, C.J.).
102 State v. Armstead, 60 So. 778, 781 (Miss. 1913).
103 MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DowN CONSTITUTION 195 (2012) ("[W]ell-connected
producers found themselves threatened by competition and by an invention called the re-
frigerator, and so helped themselves to market entry and output restrictions, in conspiracy
against consumers and potential competitors.").
104 Cap. F. Bourland Ice Co. v. Franklin Util. Co., 22 S.W.2d 993, 994 (Ark. 1929).
105 Ida
106 Id. at 995.
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determined that the ice business was a common calling in which any
person might engage without having to obtain a state-granted privi-
lege.107 Ultimately, the court concluded that "it is apparent that the
right to limit the number engaged in the manufacture and sale of ice at
any given point is for the benefit of others engaged in like business
and the benefit to the public would be remote and problematical."08
This forgotten Arkansas decision anticipated the famous Supreme
Court opinion in New State Ice Company v. Liebmann.109
At issue in New State Ice was a 1925 Oklahoma statute declaring
the manufacture and sale of ice to be a business affected with a public
interest and barring entry into the ice business without first obtaining
a certificate from a state agency.110 The act further provided that no
license should be issued unless the applicant could prove at a hearing
the necessity for such a facility."' The application was to be denied
where the existing licensed ice companies "are sufficient to meet the
public needs. .. "112 It was unclear how a new firm could prove that
the current service was inadequate. Evidently, lawmakers gave no
consideration to the prospect that a new firm might benefit consumers
with a better product or improved service. The New State Ice Com-
pany sought to enjoin Liebmann from selling ice without a license in
competition with itself.' '3 Liebmann argued that the right to engage
in a common calling was guaranteed by the due process clause, and
that the act deprived him of liberty and property in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 14
Writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Justice George
Sutherland vigorously upheld Liebmann's right to follow ordinary oc-
cupations."5  Finding that the manufacture of ice was an ordinary
business not charged with "a public use," Sutherland cut to the heart
of the matter." 6 He pointed out that "the practical tendency of the re-
striction ... is to shut out new enterprises, and thus create and foster
monopoly in the hands of existing establishments, against, rather than
in aid of, the interest of the consuming public."'1 7 Sutherland warned:
107 Id.
10s Id at 997.
109 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
10 Id. at 271.
1n Id. at 271-72.
112 Id. at 272.
" Id. at 271.
114 Id. at 281 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
115 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 279-80.
16 Id. at 277.
117 Id. at 278 ("Plainly, a regulation which has the effect of denying or unreasonably cur-
Vol. 48:2442
2018 BUCHANAN AND THE RIGHT TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY
There is no difference in principle between this case
and the attempt of the dairyman under state authority
to prevent another from keeping cows and selling milk
on the ground that there are enough dairymen in the
business; or to prevent a shoemaker from making or
selling shoes because shoemakers already in that oc-
cupation can make and sell all the shoes that are need-
ed.118
Sutherland's opinion exuded the spirit of enterprise and harked back
to the long tradition of pursuing lawful callings.'19 In marked con-
trast, the famous dissenting opinion by Justice Louis D. Brandeis
moved squarely in the opposite direction.120  Brandeis repeatedly
lambasted economic competition as "destructive" and "ruinous," and
endorsed a scheme of state-sponsored certificates to control entry into
particular business fields as the legislature dictated.121 Taking a broad
view of the state police power, he was receptive to a new age of eco-
nomic planning by government and assigned great weight to asser-
tions of state authority put forth in the name of public welfare.122 He
gave correspondingly less weight to claims of individual rights.123
Michael S. Greve tellingly characterized the Brandeis dissent as
"let's-hear-it-for-monopoly." 124
Even this brief sketch makes it plain that a jurisprudence ground-
ed on the right to acquire property and to pursue lawful callings was
tailing the common right to engage in a lawful private business, such as that under re-
view, cannot be upheld consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.").
's Id. at 279.
119 MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930s 98 (2001) ("Sutherland's remarks echo the stand-
ard economic criticisms of occupational licensing schemes and other restrictions on entry
into a trade, business, profession, or occupation."). For a discussion of Justice Suther-
land's opinion in New State Ice, see HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE
SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL LAW 53-61 (1994).
120 PHILLIPS, supra note 119, at 98.
121 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 292, 299 (Brandies, J., dissenting).
122 PHILLIPS, supra note 119, at 99-105 (analyzing the Brandeis dissent and concluding
that under his approach "even the most irrational assertions of government power could
be justified as experiments").
123 See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 304-05 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
124 GREVE, supra note 103, at 232. Brandeis left no doubt about his receptivity to mo-
nopoly grants that would curtail the right to enter callings. In New State Ice Brandeis
commented, "[i]t is no objection to the validity of the statute here assailed that it fosters




hardly calculated to safeguard the economic status quo. Instead, it
protected the ability of the weak and the fledgling competitor to pur-
sue economic opportunity notwithstanding opposition from legisla-
tively favored groups. Justice Field, a strong proponent of the right to
pursue callings, was convinced that his approach was calculated to as-
sist the disadvantaged. "I am on the other side," he explained to a
friend in 1884, "and would give the under fellow a show in this life.
It is a shame to put him off to the next world." 125 In 1913, the Su-
preme Court of Mississippi, striking down a law imposing criminal
penalties on sharecroppers who left their employment while under
contract, pointedly observed: "The citizens who would be liable to
prosecution under this statute belong to the class of the humble and
poor. Because they are among the weak of our people, it is no less
important that they be protected in their rights and liberties."l26 After
reviewing decisions striking down legislation creating entry barriers
and licensing restrictions, Herbert Hovenkamp concluded: "These de-
cisions simply cannot be characterized as a judicial decision to side
with business against labor, immigrants, and the poor. On the contra-
ry, they permitted such groups increased entry in the face of legisla-
tion design to protect established firms from competition."l27 The
simplistic narrative, fashioned by the Progressives, that respect for
property rights only benefited the wealthy or business interests, is
contradicted by the historical record.
NEw DEAL JURISPRUDENCE
For better or worse, the Brandeis dissent in New State Ice pointed
to the future. The political triumph of the New Deal in the 1930s pro-
foundly altered the prevailing understanding of constitutional law.
After 1937, the Supreme Court largely abandoned meaningful scruti-
ny of economic legislation under the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Deference to the economic judgment of legisla-
tors became the new orthodoxy. In a striking departure from the
property-centered vision of the framers, who believed that property
rights and individual liberty were closely linked, property rights were
downgraded to a secondary place in the hierarchy of constitutional
125 Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business
Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AMER.
HIST. 970, 979 n.54 (1975) (quoting Field to Mathew Deady, October 29, 1884, Field Pa-
pers (Oregon Historical Society)).
126 State v. Armstead, 60 So. 778, 781 (Miss. 1913).
127 HOVENKAMP, supra note 36, at 179. See also Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theo-
ry and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 209, 255 (2016) ("[T]he
poor were the principal beneficiaries of decisions that held entry restrictions invalid.").
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values.128 This judicially-created double standard of review was ar-
ticulated in United States v Carolene Products Co.,129 yet another
case arising out of the dairy lobby's long and sorry campaign against
competing milk products.'30 At issue was the validity of a congres-
sional measure prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of
skimmed milk compounded with any product other than milk fat. 13 1
Writing for a plurality of the Supreme Court, Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone upheld the statute.132 Harlan proclaimed:
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests
upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators.133
However, in footnote 4, Stone called for more exacting judicial scru-
tiny when "fundamental" political or civil rights were at issue.134
Nothing in the text of the Constitution or pre-New Deal constitutional
history indicates that economic rights were to receive less protection
under the due process norm than other individual rights.' 35 Nonethe-
128 JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 139-41(3rd ed. 2008).
129 United States v. Carolene Prod.'s Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (plurality opinion).
130 Id. at 145-46.
131 id
132 Id. at 154.
133 Id at 152.
134 Id. at n.4; see KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 346-47 (2d ed. 2009) The authors conclude:
Stone indicated that in the future the Court was going to give special
attention to noneconomic freedom, so much so that it was willing to
impose a double standard of review. On the matter of state economic
policy, the Court would defer to the legislature; but on issues involv-
ing civil liberties and civil rights, Stone announced that the justices
would apply special scrutiny to legislative actions and give a pre-
ferred position to liberties and rights.
Id. at 346-47; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 160-63 (2000)
(examining Carolene Products and the rise of bifurcated judicial review in constitutional
cases).
135 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50-51 (1958). Justice Hand writes:
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less, the Supreme Court has not recognized property as a "fundamen-
tal" right requiring "strict scrutiny" review.136 This constitutional di-
chotomy dominated the legal culture for decades and the federal
courts gave scant attention to property rights claims.1 37 If the rights of
property owners are downgraded and largely ignored, it is hardly a
surprise that the rights to acquire property or pursue lawful callings
experienced a similar fate. In federal and many state courts, econom-
ic legislation was now reviewed and rubberstamped under a toothless
"rational basis" standard. This supposed test is something of a legal
fiction. Rarely has legislation ever been invalidated under this supine
test. Hence, the characterization of the right at issue is almost always
outcome determinative.
The right to pursue a calling reached a nadir in the 1955 case of
Williamson v. Lee Optical.138 At issue was an Oklahoma law that
prevented an optician from fitting or duplicating eyeglass lenses into
new frames without a prescription.1 39 On its face, the measure ap-
peared to be vintage special interest legislation that burdened con-
I cannot help thinking that it would seem a strange anomaly to those
who penned the words in the Fifth to learn that they constituted
severer restrictions as to Liberty than Property. . . . I can see no more
persuasive reason for supposing that a legislature is a priori less qual-
ified to choose between 'personal' than between economic values;
and there have been strong protests, to me unanswerable, that there is
no constitutional basis for asserting a larger measure of judicial su-
pervision over the first than over the second.
Id. at 50-51. See also Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights and Per-
sonal Liberty, 2003-2004 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 9, 19 ("Economic rights, property rights,
and personal rights have been joined, appropriately, since the time of the founding.").
136 See PHILLIPS, supra note 119, at 185-92 (analyzing emergence of double standard of
judicial review and contending that economic liberties might well be deemed "fundamen-
tal").
137 The challenge in Carolene Products was based on the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. It is important to recognize that the Supreme Court adopted the same high-
ly deferential approach with respect to claims arising under other property-protective
provisions of the Constitution. In the New Deal era the once-potent contract clause was
robbed of much vitality by allowing legislatures to impair contracts if thought necessary
for a public purpose. JAMES W. ELY, JR, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 220-34 (2016). Similarly, the Supreme Court has given limited protection to
property owners under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. The regulatory doc-
trine has been narrowly construed. See, e.g., Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
Moreover, the "public use" limitation on the exercise of eminent domain, at least at the
federal level, has been drained of any meaning, allowing lawmakers broad latitude to take
private property for virtually any purpose. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545
U.S. 469 (2005); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
1 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (Douglas, J.).
139 Id. at 485-86.
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sumers and arbitrarily hampered an optician's business to protect oph-
thalmologists and optometrists from competition in fitting glasses.140
Yet the Supreme Court brushed aside the argument that he law arbi-
trarily interfered with the optician's right to do business, and instead,
hypothesized various rationales that might have justified the statute as
a public health measure.141 The Court did not require the state to pro-
duce any evidence that this was, in fact, the legislature's motive.1 42
Judicial support for the right to follow common callings would appear
to have reached the end of the trail in the federal courts. Many state
courts followed suit.
In this permissive climate, occupational licensing and entry bar-
riers proliferated. The advance of technology created new occupa-
tions deemed appropriate for regulation by license, such as dry clean-
ing, as well as radio and television repair services.143  After World
War II, states increasingly asserted their authority over an expanding
range of occupations. For example, in some states, licenses were re-
quired to be a cosmetologist, a florist, a fisher, an interior designer, a
horse massager, and a shampoo assistant.144 Commentators expressed
140 Id. at 486-87.
141 Id. at 487-88.
142 For a critical analysis of Lee Optical, see Paul Avelar & Keith Diggs, Economic Lib-
erty and the Arizona Constitution: A Survey of Forgotten History, 49 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 355,
376-77 (2017) ("Lee Optical thus established the farce that is the modem federal rational
basis standard for economic liberty. The Lee Optical Court postulated its own reasons to
uphold the challenged law and refused to subject those assumptions to any scrutiny.").
Randy E. Barnett has written that:
The modem rational basis approach adopted by the Warren Court in
Lee Optical represents a judicial abdication of its function to police
the Constitution's limits on legislative power. It accomplished this
by combining its formalist irrebuttable presumption of constitutional-
ity with a judicially-invented distinction between economic and per-
sonal liberties found nowhere in the Constitution.
Randy E. Barnett, Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 845, 860 (2012). See also St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215,
221 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013) ("Justice Douglas's opinion in
Williamson v. Lee Optical is generally seen as the zenith of this judicial deference to state
economic regulation... , including its willingness to accept post hoc hypotheses for eco-
nomic regulation.").
143 People v. Murphy, 110 N.W.2d 805 (Mich. 1961) (upholding municipal ordinance
licensing television repair services); McLellan v. Kan. City, 379 S.W.2d 500 (Mo. 1964)
(rejecting due process challenge to law requiring license to engage in business of provid-
ing television and radio services, finding it to be a valid exercise of police power).
144 Larkin, supra note 127, at 216-18 (2016) (noting "[o]ccupational licensing require-
ments are widespread throughout our economy," and also providing a list of numerous
occupations subject to licensing, and noting that many regulations bear no credible rela-
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alarm at the spread of licensing, warning such restrictions hurt per-
sons of modest means and were of questionable value in protecting
the public. "Occupational regulation," one critic charged, "has served
to limit consumer choice, raise consumer costs, increase practitioner
income, limit practitioner mobility, deprive the poor of adequate ser-
vices, and restrict job opportunities for minorities - all without a
demonstrated improvement in quality or safety of the licensed activi-
ties."l45 Because states have different requirements for particular oc-
cupational licenses, the burden of licensure regimes falls especially
hard on persons who frequently move from state to state, such as mili-
tary spouses.
TWILIGHT FOR JURISPRUDENCE OF ECONoMiC LIBERTY
Notwithstanding the general acceptance of licensing, judicial
support for the right to pursue callings never entirely disappeared
from the state courts. Some courts declined to blindly defer to the
professed legislative rationale for regulatory measures, and thus, as-
serted the authority to examine the reasonableness of the legislative
judgment. For example, in 1938, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
stressed that the police power could not be exercised to prevent per-
sons from pursuing lawful employment.146 A year later the Supreme
Court of Tennessee declared that the Constitution "guarantees to the
individual personal liberty, the right to acquire, hold and dispose of
property."147 It voided a state law fixing the minimum prices for bar-
ber services as a violation of the right to engage in a common occupa-
tion.148
Similarly, between 1933 and 1955, several state courts drew the
tionship to public health and safety).
145 S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA 1
(1987). See also Larkin, supra note 127, at 235-36 (observing that occupational licens-
ing requirements "limit the number of service providers, thereby allowing the members
of a given trade to avoid competition and raise prices, without supplying the correspond-
ing service quality improvement promised to consumers."); Gellhorn, supra note 68, at
25 ("Only the credulous can conclude that licensure is in the main intended to protect the
public rather than those who have been licensed or, perhaps in some instances, those who
do the licensing." ); Joseph Sanderson, Don't Bury the Competition: The Growth of Oc-
cupational Licensing and a Toolbox for Reform, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 456 ("Widely
regarded as increasing the prices consumers pay and excluding the economically disad-
vantaged from well-paid jobs and condemned by progressive and libertarian commenta-
tors alike, these laws nonetheless not only remain on the books, but continue to prolifer-
ate at an alarming rate.").
146 State v. Withrow, 280 N.W. 364 (Wis. 1938) (invalidating regulation barring use of
grade stallions for breeding purposes).
147 State v. Greeson, 124 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tenn. 1939).
148 Id. at 191.
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line at legislation that required a license for persons to engage in
commercial photography. In the leading case of State v. Ballance, in
1949, the Supreme Court of North Carolina voided a statute prohibit-
ing the practice of photography for compensation unless the photog-
rapher passed an examination by a board composed of professional
photographers and paid an examination fee.149  Strongly affirming
that constitutional guarantees of liberty encompass the right to pursue
vocations, the court insisted the legislature could not unreasonably
curtail this right.s0 It found no relationship between commercial pho-
tography and public health, safety, and morals.15 Moreover, the
court failed to perceive any unique skill that justified licensing pho-
tographers as distinct from a variety of other occupations.'5 2  The
court strikingly added that limiting the practice of photography "runs
counter to the economic philosophy generally accepted in this country
that ordinarily the public is best served by the free competition of free
men in a free market."'5 3 In this regard, the court noted that the Con-
stitution of North Carolina declared: "Monopolies are contrary to the
genius of a free State and ought not to be allowed." 54 Reaching the
same conclusion, the Supreme Court of Montana also emphasized the
anti-monopoly theme. It stated that a commercial photography li-
cense theme "is not in the interests of the general welfare but is solely
for the benefit of those in the legislative authorized monopoly."55
Along the same line, a few state courts invalidated laws requiring
that, in order to engage in the business of watch repairing, a person
must first pass an examination and obtain a license from a board.
Courts noted the statutes tended toward creating a monopoly, and, in
the words of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, gave the licensing
board authority "which might deny some citizens their inherent right
to earn their livelihood in a private field of work, thus depriving them
of a valuable property right without due process of law."1 56
149 State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. 1949), overruling State v. Lawrence, 197 S.E.
586 (N.C. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 638 (1938).
Iso Id. at 770.
'i Id. at 769-71.
152 Id at 771.
153 Id For a positive assessment of Ballance, see Dellinger, supra note 135, at 14-16.
154 Ballance, 51 S.E.2d at 772.
155 State v. Gleason, 277 P.2d 530, 533 (Mont. 1954).
156 State ex rel. Whetsel v. Wood, 248 P.2d 612, 615 (Okla. 1952). See also Livesay v.
Tenn. Bd. of Examiners in Watchmaking, 322 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1959) (invalidating
statute requiring licensing of persons engaged in business of repairing watches as denying
right to enter private field of work). But see Watchmaking Examining Bd. v. Husar, 182
N.W.2d 257 (Wis. 1971) (upholding license scheme on grounds that legislature sought to
protect public from incompetence).
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Occasionally, anti-competitive measures ran afoul of constitu-
tional limitations. As noted above, regulations governing the sale of
milk products produced substantial litigation. Several state courts in-
validated local laws forbidding the sale of milk in a community unless
the milk was processed in a local plant. In finding no relationship be-
tween such a law and the purported objective of public health and
safety, a New York appellate court pointedly observed: "The infer-
ence is inescapable that the purpose of such an ordinance, in modern
times, is not to protect the public health but to set up a barrier against
competition from sources outside the municipality."1 57  The court
ruled that the law was arbitrary and unreasonable, and accordingly,
remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether the neces-
sary municipal permits should be issued.158 Finding a similar ordi-
nance unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Georgia lectured:
human dignity and individual freedom demand that
one engaged in a lawful business injurious to no one
must not be arbitrarily prevented from the legitimate
prosecution of his business by city ordinances which
set up trade barriers solely for the purpose of protect-
ing a resident against proper competition. If free en-
terprise is to mean more than mere words, it must not
become the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory leg-
islation.1 59
Other regulations sought to bar certain dairy products from the
market. At issue in Defiance Milk Products Company v. Du Mond,
was a New York law prohibiting the sale of evaporated skimmed milk
unless it was in a container of no less than 10 pounds.1 60 There was
no dispute the milk was a wholesome product.'61 Thus, the state de-
fended the statute on the unlikely grounds that there was a danger of
confusion and deception to the public in the sale of evaporated
skimmed milk in small cans.162 A divided New York Court of Ap-
peals was not convinced.163 The court held that the law was so arbi-
trary and unreasonable as to violate due process.164 The majority
157 Tenny v. Sainsbury, 184 N.Y.S.2d 185, 191 (4th Dept. 1959).
' Id. at 191-92.
159 Moultrie Milk Shed v. City of Cairo, 57 S.E.2d 199, 202 (Ga. 1950).
160 Defiance Milk Products Company v. Du Mond, 132 N.E.2d 829, 830 (N.Y. 1956).
161 id
162 Id. at 831.
163 id
164 Id at 830.
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ruled that the minimum capacity specified was too large for retail
sales, and the measure effectively prevented sales for household
use.1 65 Further, the majority emphasized that the property rights of
individuals included the right to sell non-harmful products.'66 In an
especially revealing dissenting opinion, three judges stressed the
broad scope of the police power, and urged judicial deference to legis-
lative determinations pursuant to the "rational basis" test.167 These
dissenting judges maintained that the legislature might have perceived
there was a danger of deception or confusion to the public.1 68
However, these handful of decisions vindicating economic free-
dom were swimming against the tide. The dissenting opinion in Defi-
ance Milk proved a better guide to the future. As we have seen, post-
New Deal jurisprudence dictated an expansive reading of the police
power and near-complete deference to legislative judgement in eco-
nomic matters. It held that legislation was presumed constitutional,
and therefore, insisted that the breadth of the police power was a mat-
ter for legislative, not judicial, decision. Indeed, the police power in-
creasingly functioned as a sort of talisman that could trump the con-
stitutional guarantees of property and contract. Licensure and entry
barriers flourished. Conversely, judicial affirmation of the right to ac-
quire property and to follow ordinary callings withered. Nor did most
courts evidence any sustained concern about the obvious monopolistic
features of such anti-competitive regimes.
AN UNCERTAIN RENAISSANCE
Despite decades of general neglect, the right to pursue callings
could not be easily banished from constitutional law. There are signs
that in recent years both federal and state courts have become more
concerned with securing the right to engage in a vocation or follow a
business opportunity without arbitrary restraints. During the 1980s,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals insisted that the opportunity to pur-
sue an occupation was a constitutionally protected liberty interest.'69
In 1999, the Supreme Court extended a tepid recognition of this prin-
ciple.170 "In a line of earlier cases," it observed, "this Court has indi-
cated that the liberty component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause includes some generalized due process right to choose
165 Id.
166 Defiance, 132 N.E.2d at 830.
161 Id. at 832-36.
168 Id.
169 Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1987).
1o See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
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one's field of private employment, but a right which is nevertheless
subject to reasonable government regulation."l7 1
More significantly, some courts began looking more skeptically
at laws restricting occupational choices and imposing barriers on par-
ticular businesses. As the health and safety justification for such reg-
ulations grew ever more attenuated, courts truggled with the question
of whether outright economic protection of certain interests against
competition was a legitimate state purpose. Of course, as we have
seen, courts long tended to accept at face value almost any health and
safely argument-however dubious-and likewise overlook the obvious
protectionist aspects of licenses and entry barriers. Recall that in Lee
Optical, the Supreme Court hypothesized a questionable public health
rationale, but did not consider whether economic protectionism stand-
ing alone would satisfy the "rational basis" test.172 In 1994, a federal
district court in Texas struck a blow for economic liberty by invalidat-
ing a Houston anti-jitney ordinance and rejecting economic protec-
tionism as a legitimate state goal.173 At issue was a 1924 municipal
law providing that no jitney with a capacity of less than 15 passengers
could operate on city streets.17 4 The effect of the ordinance was to
protect streetcar companies from competition by putting jitneys out of
business.'7 5 The city sought to defend the law on the grounds of cur-
rent traffic safety concerns.176 However, the court was unpersuaded
by the safety argument and maintained that he ordinance was "eco-
nomic protectionism in its most glaring form."1 77 Finding the law had
no relationship to public health, safety, or welfare, the court conclud-
ed the ordinance was harmful because it deprived the public of a
needed form of public transportation.1 78
In the same vein, a pair of circuit court decisions took aim at the
use of licensure requirements to safeguard a cartel in the funeral in-
dustry.17 9 In Craigmiles v. Giles, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
struck down a Tennessee law banning the sale of caskets by persons
not licensed as funeral directors.8 0 To obtain a license, an applicant
171 Id.
172 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
173 Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601, 608-09 (S.D. Texas 1994).
174 Id. at 603.
171 Id. at 603, 606, 608.
176 Id. at 606-08.
177 Id. at 608.
178 Id.
179 Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir 2002); St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712
F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
1so Craigmiles, 312 F.3d at 222.
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was required to complete two years of training and pass an examina-
tion. The court determined these requirements amounted to "a signif-
icant barrier to entering the Tennessee casket market."' This law
was challenged by persons who sold caskets but provided no other
funeral services.182 The court held the license mandate was not ra-
tionally related to public health or consumer protection, reasoning that
the requirement "impose[d] a significant barrier to competition in the
casket market" and harmed consumers.183 Criticizing the legislature's
"naked attempt to raise a fortress protecting the monopoly rents that
funeral directors extract from consumers", the court concluded the
measure could not even survive "rational basis" review.1 84
A decade later, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a
Louisiana statute granting state-licensed funeral directors the exclu-
sive right to sell caskets violated the due process rights of non-profit
charities to sell caskets.!8 5 The court insisted that the measure was
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in promot-
ing public health and safety, and flatly denied that "mere economic
protection of a particular industry" was a legitimate public purpose
that could sustain the restriction.!8 6 In conclusion, the court stated:
"[t]he great deference due state economic regulation does not demand
judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the context of
its adoption nor does it require courts to accept nonsensical explana-
tions for regulation."1 87
This line of cases contemplated some degree of judicial inquiry
into the state's professed rationale for economic regulation, and em-
phatically rejected the notion that anti-competitive protection con-
ferred on a particular industry constituted a legitimate state interest.
Therefore, the cases represent a partial crack in the post-New Deal or-
thodoxy that economic legislation was not to receive meaningful due
process review. Unsurprisingly, some federal courts were quick to
disagree and insist upon a deferential posture toward legislative au-
thority over economic matters.
For instance, at issue in Powers v. Harris, was the validity of an
Oklahoma law providing that only licensed funeral directors could
8 Id at 224-25.
182 Id. at 222-23.
18 Id. at 225-28.
184 Id. at 229.
185 St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217, 219 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134
S. Ct. 423 (2013).
Id. at 222, 226.
8 Id. at 226.
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sell caskets.18 8 Brushing aside an argument that the challengers had a
right to pursue lawful callings, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that legislative conferral of exclusive privilege of sale upon the
funeral industry served a legitimate state purpose and satisfied "ra-
tional basis" review.1 89 The court saw no constitutional bar to states
enacting anti-competitive measures to aid favored groups.
190 The
court perceived the issue in political terms, rather than legal terms,
lecturing that "the definition of the public good changes with the po-
litical winds. There is simply no constitutional or Platonic form
against which we can (or could) judge the wisdom of economic regu-
lation." 91 The court then concluded with the time-honored advice
that the complainants should resort to the polls for relief.192
In 2015, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this analy-
sis, finding no due process objection to a Connecticut requirement
that only licensed dentists could perform certain teeth-whitening pro-
cedures.193 Critics charged that the regulation amounted to state pro-
tection of the monopoly position of dentists.'94 Dismissing this con-
tention as irrelevant, the court reasoned that states had wide latitude to
favor some economic groups over others.'95 Further, it gave no atten-
tion to the right to pursue lawful callings and relegated concern over
economic protectionism to the political arena. A concurring judge
expressed doubt that pure economic protectionism was a legitimate
state interest for purposes of "rational basis" review, and perceptively
warned that the majority opinion "essentially renders rational basis
review a nullity in the context of economic regulation."'
96
Even the most absurd anti-competitive regulations could find
shelter under the banner of economic protectionism. For example, a
federal district court upheld a Louisiana requirement, unique to that
state, that retail florists must pass a licensure examination to sell
88 Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004).
`9 Id. at 1214-15, 1222.
190 Id. at 1218-22.
191 Id at 1218. A concurring judge expressed doubt about the majority's "almost per se
rule upholding intrastate protectionist legislation", and observed that restrictions on cas-
ket sales seem to harm rather than protect consumer interests. Id. at 1226-27.
192 Id. at 1225.
193 Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 283-85 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied
136 S. Ct. 1160 (2016).
194 Id. at 286-88.
195 id
'9 6 Id. at 289-90. See TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC
FREEDOM AND THE LAW 153-56 (2010) (criticizing the notion that laws conferring eco-
nomic privileges for a preferred group regardless of impact on the public is a legitimate
state interest).
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flowers.197 Although recognizing that the right to pursue callings is a
constitutionally protected interest, the court emphasized that the state
could impose reasonable regulations.198 Apparently accepting the no-
tion that consumers were too stupid to select flowers on their own, the
court concluded that the licensing examination was "rationally related
to the state's desire that floral arrangements will be assembled proper-
ly in a manner least likely to cause injury to a consumer and will be
prepared in a proper, cost efficient manner."199 Notwithstanding this
judicial rhetoric, any connection between occupational restrictions on
florists and public welfare is highly tenuous. The opinion is best un-
derstood as an expression of blind judicial deference to economic
regulations.
The validity of applying the licensing requirements for cos-
metologists to persons practicing African style hair braiding has di-
vided federal courts. Two federal district courts have concluded that
such application failed "rational basis" review, and found a violation
of the due process right to pursue a livelihood.200 They reasoned that
the state-mandated training and testing requirements were largely ir-
relevant to African hair braiding, and that the regulatory scheme bore
no rational relationship to the public health and safety.201 In the same
vein, a federal district court determined that application of the state
facility and equipment requirements for barber schools to an African
braiding school did not advance public health and safety interests and
were so irrational as to violate due process.202 On the other hand, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld application of state cosmetol-
ogy training and testing requirements to African style hair braiders.
Stressing the heavy deference that federal courts must show to gov-
ernment economic regulations under the rational basis standard, the
court even hypothesized possible reasons for the licensing regime. It
brushed aside the argument that the license requirement imposed a
costly training program of little relevance to hair braiders.203 As this
ruling makes clear, the "rational basis" test is frequently understood
as precluding any inquiry into the factual background or actual work-
ing of economic regulations, thereby facilitating irrational and even
197 Meadows v. Odom, 360 F. Supp. 2d 811, 822-23, 825 (M.D. La. 2005), vacated as
moot, 198 Fed. App'x 348 (5th Cir. 2006).
198 Id. at 819-21.
199 Id. at 824.
200 COTWell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1118-19 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Clayton v.
Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Utah 2012).
201 Id.
202 Brantley v. Kuntz, 98 F. Supp. 3d 884 (W.D. Tex. 2015).




As this discussion indicates, the record of the federal courts in
protecting the right to follow a common occupation has been decided-
ly mixed in recent years, and is likely to remain so until the Supreme
Court weighs in on the question. However, there have been important
developments at the state level. For example, in Patel v. Texas De-
partment of Licensing and Regulation, the Supreme Court of Texas
took a major step toward the revitalization of occupational free-
dom.204 The state had long regulated the practice of cosmetology.
205
To obtain a basic license an applicant had to complete 750 hours of
instruction in a training program and pass a test.206 This requirement
was challenged as a violation of the "due course of law" clause of the
Texas Constitution by individuals engaged in commercial eyebrow
threading.207  Eyebrow threading is practiced primarily within the
South Asian and Middle Eastern communities.208 The Texas Supreme
Court interpreted the "due course of law" provision to confer some-
what greater protection for individuals challenging economic regula-
tion than the comparable federal "due process" norm.209 Specifically,
it ruled that in as-applied challenges to economic legislation the party
must demonstrate either (1) that the statute could not meet the "ra-
tional basis" test, or (2) that "the statute's . . . real-world effect as ap-
plied to the challenging party could not arguably be rationally related
to, or is so burdensome as to be oppressive in light of, the governmen-
tal interest."2 10 The court explained that under this approach the in-
quiry "will in most instances require the reviewing court to consider
the entire record, including evidence offered by the parties."2 11 Ap-
plying this standard, it determined that the requirement of 750 hours
of training, large numbers of which were unrelated to eyebrow thread-
ing, coupled with the expense and lost employment opportunity, was
so burdensome as to run afoul of the "due course of law" language of
the state constitution as applied to the threaders.2 12
Even more remarkable was the concurring opinion by Don R.
204 Patel v. Texas Dep't of Licensing and Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015).
205 id.
206 Id at 73.
207 Article 1, § 19 of the Texas Constitution states: "No citizen of the State shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised,
except by the due course of law of the land."
208 Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 73.
209 Id. at 83.
210 Id. at 87.
211 id
212 Id. at 90.
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Willett, joined by two other justices. Willett authored a strong affir-
mation of economic liberty as a central tenet of American constitu-
tionalism, sharply criticizing the double standard of judicial review
which relegates economic rights to a lesser echelon of solicitude. Rid-
iculing the "rational basis" test applied in the federal courts as really
no test at all,213 he maintained that the Texas Constitution provides
more searching review of government infringement of economic lib-
erty than the minimal federal test.214
Turning to the issue of occupational regulation, Willett cut to the
heart of the licensing controversy: "Must courts rubber-stamp even
the most nonsensical encroachments on occupational freedom?"215
He answered the question emphatically in the negative. Noting the
proliferation of licensing since World War II, Willett expressed con-
cern that occupational licensing was often more about bestowing spe-
cial privileges on favored groups than about safeguarding the pub-
lic. 216 Pointing out that licensure schemes predominately hampered
persons of modest means, he argued that there was a serious discon-
nect between various licensing rules and the public interest.217
The dissenting opinion by three justices was largely a rehash of
the post-New Deal orthodoxy of judicial deference to legislative deci-
sions on economic matters and broke no new ground.2 18 But one
point raised by the dissent warrants further consideration. The dis-
senters repeatedly charged that the majority and concurring opinions
opened the door for a return to the supposed evils of New York v.
Lochner.2 19 Indeed, the dissenting opinion warned that the "Lochner
monster" has been "rediscovered and unleashed by the Court."220 The
famous Lochner decision, of course, is the subject of a vast literature
which cannot be unpacked here.221 Suffice it to say that the caricature
213 Id. at 98 (Willett, J., concurring).
214 Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 110-12.
215 Id at 93.
216 Id. at 123.
217 Id. at 103-09. On December 13, 2017 the United States Senate confirmed President
Donald Trump's nomination of Judge Willett to a seat on the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
218 Id. at 126-43.
219 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, a divided Supreme Court
struck down a New York law that restricted work in bakeries to ten hours a day or sixty
hours a week. Writing for the majority, Justice Peckham found that the measure violated
the liberty of contract as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
220 Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 138. See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 302 ("The ghost of Lochner
hangs over due process challenges to laws that restrict entry to occupations.").
221 See, e.g., PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF
LOCHNER V. NEW YORK (1990).
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of Lochner fashioned by the Progressives has been largely destroyed
by revisionist historians.222 The notion of a draconian Lochner era is
a myth.223 In fact, the Supreme Court never sought to implement a
laissez-faire regime and invalidated relatively few regulatory
measures on due process grounds. The Lochner decision, however, is
still trotted out as a sort of scarecrow whenever any court defends
economic rights. In reality, it was hardly the Halloween monster of
constitutional legend.
Similarly, there are also signs that some state courts have begun
to take a hard look at other forms of anti-competitive regulations and
entry barriers to business. Liquor laws have given rise to complaints
about economic protectionism. In Louis Finocchiaro, Inc v. Nebraska
Liquor Control Commission, the Supreme Court of Nebraska struck
down a price-fixing scheme which prevented volume discounts by
wholesalers in order to protect small retailers from competition. 224it
reasoned that when a statute "under the guise of a police regulation,
does not tend to preserve the public health, safety, or welfare, but
tends more to stifle legitimate business by creating a monopoly or
trade barrier, it is unconstitutional as an invasion of the property
rights of the individual."225 In 2017, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina declared unconstitutional a statute limiting an operator to
three retail liquor licenses.226 The avowed purpose of the restriction
was to protect existing liquor store owners from competition. Rea-
soning that such limitation did not promote the health, safety or mor-
als of the public, the court concluded that economic protectionism ex-
ceeded the state's police powers.227  The dissent urged judicial
deference to legislative judgment and levied the predictable charge
that the majority was summoning Lochner's ghost.228
THE PATH AHEAD
Where do we go from here? Certainly, it would be hazardous to
222 See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011). See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL
LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 338-40 (2014) (discussing freedom of contract doctrine and
maintaining that Lochner was correctly decided).
223 James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of Contractual Rights: A Tale of Two Constitutional
Provisions, 1 N.Y.U.J. L. & LIBERTY 370, 391-92 (2005) (questioning the existence of a
supposed Lochner era).
224 Louis Finocchiaro, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 217 Neb. 487 (1984).
225 Id. at 491.
226 Retail Services & Systems, Inc. v. South Carolina Dep't of Revenue, 419 S.C. 469
(2017).
227 Id. at 471-76.
228 Id. at 484, n.21.
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predict a major revival of the right to pursue ordinary callings free of
onerous restrictions based on a handful of cases, however welcome.
The pull of the post-New Deal orthodoxy, relegating economic rights
to a sort of constitutional limbo, remains strong. Indeed, a supposedly
conservative Supreme Court has done relatively little to revive the
rights of property owners in the face of pervasive government.229 A
significant strengthening of economic rights would require a sea
change in thinking that would recapture the property-centered consti-
tutionalism of the framers. Courts would need to reconsider the policy
of affording near-conclusive deference to economic legislation, and to
make some inquiry into the actual effect of regulatory measures.230
At the same time, courts would need to recognize occupational free-
dom as a fundamental right deserving of a high level of scrutiny.231
As discussed above, the right to follow lawful vocations has
found some recent support in both judicial opinions and scholarly lit-
erature. Yet meaningful judicial scrutiny of occupational licensing
remains spotty. An incremental increase in judicial protection of oc-
cupational freedom seems the most likely prospect at the present. A
fledgling turn in this direction may gain traction from a recent initia-
tive by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). In March 2017, the
FTC formed an Economic Liberty Task Force to focus on excessive
occupational licensing and other barriers to economic opportunity.232
By detailing the growth of licensing and pointing out that licensing
regimes often burden consumers and stifle opportunities for disadvan-
taged individuals, the Task Force may help to shape a popular and ju-
dicial climate favorable to reform.
It is especially noteworthy that the right to acquire property has
been affirmed by several state courts, even if in dicta. The Supreme
229 STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF How, WHY, AND WHAT WE
OwN 271 (2011) (observing that by the end of the twentieth century "property rights
clearly received more protection from government regulation than they had a few decades
before, but exactly how much more was a matter for debate"); James W. Ely Jr, "Poor
Relation" Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights ofProperty Owners,
2005 CATO L. REV. 39, 39 (2005) (explaining, "[t]he [Supreme] Court has not demon-
strated a sustained commitment to meaningful enforcement of individual property
rights.").
230 Louis Finocchiaro, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm'n, 217 Neb. 487, 489-90
(1984). ("There must be some clear and real connection between the assumed purpose of
the law and its actual provisions.").
231 Avelar & Diggs, supra note 142, at 432 (stating, "[t]he right to earn an honest living,
free of unreasonable government interference, is an individual right just as important as
any other.").
232 Economic Liberty: Opening Doors to Opportunity, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/economic-liberty (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
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Court of Nebraska declared in 1984:
The constitutional guarantees of our Bill of Rights
contemplate that every person legally possesses the
right of acquiring the absolute and unqualified title to
every species of property recognized by law, with all
the rights incidental thereto, and, in connection with
the right of personal liberty, it includes the right to
dispose of such property in such innocent manner as
he pleases, and to sell it at such price as he can obtain
in fair barter.233
More recently, in City of Norwood v. Horney the Supreme Court of
Ohio observed: "The rights related to property, i.e., to acquire, use,
enjoy and dispose of property, are among the most revered in our law
and traditions. Indeed, property rights are integral aspects of our the-
ory of democracy and notions of liberty." 234 The court cited Buchan-
an to support this proposition.235 Thus, the right to acquire property
retains some validity.
In December 1829, James Madison addressed the Virginia con-
stitutional convention. He insisted:
[i]t is sufficiently obvious, that persons now and prop-
erty are the two great subjects on which Governments
are to act; and that the rights of persons, and the rights
of property, are the objects, for the protection of
which Government was instituted. These rights cannot
well be separated. The personal right to acquire prop-
erty, which is a natural right, gives to property, when
acquired, a right to protection, as a social right.236
Notably, Madison linked the right to acquire property with the "rights
of persons." More than 100 years later the renowned attorney John
W. Davis echoed Madison. "History," Davis declared, "furnishes no
instance where the right of man to acquire and hold property has been
taken away without the complete destruction of liberty in all its
233 Finocchiaro, 217 Neb. at 490.
234 City of Norwood v. Homey, 110 Ohio St. 3d 353, 361-62 (Ohio 2006).
235 id
236 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, COMPRISING His PUBLIC PAPERS AND His
PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 360-61 (1910), available at
http://oll.1ibertyfund.org/titles/madison-the-writings-vol-9-1819-1836.
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forms."237 Davis correctly perceived that private property provides
the key pillar for the enjoyment of political freedom. We disregard the
insights of Madison and Davis at our peril.238
237 As quoted in WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W.
DAVIS 347 (1973).
238 See RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 283-92 (1999) (analyzing the connec-
tion between property rights and political liberty, and concluding that "[p]roperty is an
indispensable ingredient of both prosperity and freedom.").

